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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LaVELL KEMP and THELMA
ALICE KEMP, his wife,
Third Party Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
vs.
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE
This is an action involving a contest between the
Third Party Plaintiffs-Appellants and Defendant-Re·
spondent as to a priority of mortgage betwe(:m the Appellants, who were vendors of the property and took back
a first mortgage to secure the unpaid balance of the
purchase price, and the Defendant-Respondent, who as
a lender, loaned part of the money for the purchase
price and received back a Deed of Trust or mortgage to
secure the payment of the moneys advanced for part of
the purchase price and other moneys loaned.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury and submitted on two
special interrogatories. The lower court rendered its
decision in favor of the Defendant-Respondent and denied Plaintiffs -Appellants' Motion for a New Trial
From the judgment for the Defendant-Respondent, Third
Party Plaintiffs-Appellants appeal
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Third Party Plaintiffs-Appellants seek reversal of
the judgment of the lower oourt.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
LaVeil Kemp and Thelma Alice Kemp, his wife,
Appellants, were owners either in fee or by virtue of
purchasers on a real estate contract, of certain tracts of
looated at Draper, Utah. They were lay people
:111d int>xpe.rienced in the handling of real estate transactions being more experienced in the egg producing business. They sold their property to Dr. Joseph W. Noble
in whom they had confidence, for the sum of $40,000.00
payable at $11,000.00 cash and the remaining $29,000.00
to be paid in monthly installments evidenced by a PromNote and a first mortgage on the property. Relying upon the agreement and representations of Dr. Noble,
they executed and delivered a Warranty Deed to Dr.
Noble and received back the Promissory Note and the
mortgage; these documents having been prepared by Dr.
Noble's attorney. This transaction took place in the latter
part of November 1964.
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Dr. Noble in turn made an application t:o Zions First
National Bank to borrow money, part of which was to
pay the down payment owed to the Kemps, part of which
was t:o pay the costs of moving certain improvements
from Holladay t:o the Draper property and part of which
was to be used for his own use in the sum of $35,000.00
total. Zions First National Bank also received a mortgage to secure its note which purportedly was also a
first mortgage. Zions First National Bank prepared the
closing statement for the parties. Zions First National
Bank also handled certain moneys held by them for the
paying of placing certain improvements on the Draper
property. Dr. Noble in turn sold the property to a
Ferroll Fullmer on a contract for $64,000.00. Due to
survey and title problems, Zions First National Bank
made disbursements on or about December 4, 1964 and
recorded its mortgage on that day. The Kemps, not
knowing that they had to record their mortgage, did not
record their mortgage until 1966, nearly two years later.
The dates on the Noble-Kemp transaction, to-wit:
'J'he Deed, Mortgage and Note are apparently filled in
by Dr. Noble in that the Deed has a date of November 30,
but referring to a Mortgage made of even date.
The jury unanimously found that Zions First National Bank reasonably should have been aware of the
unpaid balance on the purchase price owed by Dr. Noble
to the Kemps.
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ARGUMENT
WHICH MORTGAGE HAS PRIORITY, AN
UNRECORDED PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE OR A RECORDED MORTGAGE OF
A THIRD PARTY LENDER WHO DID NOT
HAVE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
UNPAID BALANCE BUT HAD ENOUGH
INFORMATION THAT IT SHOULD HAVE
BEEN AWARE OF AN UNPAID BALANCET
Plaintiffs contend that their mortgage is prior to
Zions First National Bank in two ways:
A. By virtue of a purchase money mortgage; and
B. Constructive notice on the part of Zions First
National Bank or notice of inquiry.
A. Purchase money mortgage: This type of purchase money mortgage where a seller, pursU8lllt to a
prior contract or without one, conveys title to a buyer
and received ,at that time part of the purchase money
and receives as part of the same transaction, a mortgage
upon the property to secure the balance of the purchase
money. Zions First Nationru Bank's position is also a
form of a purehase money mortgage who advances part
of the purchase price and ·a mortgage back to secure
not only the part of the money loaned for the purchase
{Jroperty, but also for the balance of the money loaned.
This type of situation presents a most difficult question
5

as to the priority of these purchase money mortgages,
Because of this type of problem, your writer respectful!)
u:rges the court to read ve:ry oa:refully, the dissertation
on this subject jn 4 Amenean Law of Property 219. 226, :
Because c,f the manuer in which this ::,ubject haR been
trt>a'too in the aforesaid reference, thi.s writer wishes to
quote
thfr,
those :matters wh1.oh bt=> wishes
to !:le stressed. Each qnote wiH be followed by the
m,· pages wherC'.in the q<.HJtP
be found, to-wit.
". , . It is familiar l;'.arning that a purchase rno11e>·
mortg2ge, executed at the same time as the deed
of pnrchase of land, or in pnrsnance of agreement as part of one continuous transact1:nn, t::ikPi:;
precedence over anv other claim or lien attaching
to the JH'Operty th:rongh the vendee-mortgagor.
This is so
tlto ugh the claim antida tef; the
f'Xecntion of tb'" wo1tp;age to the seller It will
also l!Bve priui <- d' ;;_ i:-o in favor of a t]1i1d
)Wrso.n
ad' 11
-'ti:· lh'-' <>has<" '11Tn.eY iiaid. +n
'chc> ,Pnrlor, provlu·
:he 1T11,n1•y wa;3 lo:..uwd foi
ptu-pm:;e onl · .'' · (· 1nphasis t>dded)
:t20 .
. ¥/here the ('C•n LerJt. i;.; bt"tw<>er.. o. Jmn·hai'("
mo ne v rnoi-tgage k a. tbll'c1 person -,vho adv a.nee'
part of the pm cnase }H'J\;e and a. pnrc1mse moue:
mortgage to the vendor for [he balance, the 1 att;ir
:s gi•,cen
e·J<c:n if he had
of till'
:Fenner," Pages 221
Several rationales have been advanced for
tlns favoritism of the Jaw for the purchase mone.\'
mortgagee. The :rri;:;,st venern.blc B;od frequently
stated explanation is that of transitory seiiin
The idea is that title shot into the grantee and
out of him again into the purchase money rnort1
' •••

()

gagee, so fleetingly - quasi uno flattu, in one
breath, as it were - that no other interest had
time to fasten itself to it: the grantee-mortgagor
must be regarded as a mere conduit. Such a theory
b:reaks down in lien states where the fee remains
P'ffmanently in the granfaec.morlgagor. It also
·Ir:,; inconsistent with the cases of quite common
occurrence in which some considerable time
elapses between the conveyance to the mortgagor
and the execution of the mortgage. If the reason
were to be (aken literally it would require the
e:tecution of the deed of purchase and the excution of the mo,rtgage to be practically simultaneous, something that is ordinarily not feasible and
not required by the cases. As was said by an able
1udge in a leading case, "An examination of the
!'ases will show that the real test is not whether
ihP deed and mortgage were in fact executed at
the same instant, or even on the same day, but
whether they were parts of one continuous transilction, and so -intended to be, so that the two
should be given contemporane-0us
c;peration in oT·<l<"r to promote the intent of the
parties.'' Pa,ges 222-223.
" .. A netter sb:tte1l!ent of the reason for the rule
iB that {he title comes to the purchaser already
charged witJ1 the encumbrance in favor of the
grantor-mortgagol'.'; that regardless of the form
all that the transa,ction ever transfers is the redemption right While such a conclusion would
!Square with the decisions where the purchase
money mortgage goes to the vendor, it is more
difficnlt to apply it to the mortgage going to a
third party lender of the purchase price, although
It has been advanced in such a case. Furthermore,
it would seem that the opposite conclusion could
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have been reached just as easily. Indeed it would
have been easier to do so, since in f onn there
is a transfer of the fall title without reservation l
and the grantee then by a separate mortgage
instrument creates the charge on it. So, unless
the matter is dug into more deeply, one is left
unsatisfied as to why this one of two perfectly
possible conclusions has been chosen.

1

A little delving, though, does give more illuminating answers. One is somewhat technical and
legalistic. The other more satisfactorily deals
with it as a matter of intrinsic fairness based upon
the just expectations on the part of the purchase '
money mortgagee. The first answer suggests that
the purchase money mortgage always takes the
place of an equitable interest in the property that
precedes any lien or interest of any kind attaching
to the purchaser's estate at the time of acquiring
title. Where there is a. prior contract of sale: this
equitable interest consists of a specifically enforceable contract right to have the purchase
money mortgage given on taking title, and the
equitable: estate under the purchase contract is
subject to this right. Where there is no prior
contract the vendor has left in him on conveying
title without receiving payment an equitable: vendor's lien. When the purchase money mortgage
is given it merely replaces and takes the priority
of one of the other of these prio,r equities, and this
is so whether it is given at once or subsequently,
provided it is part of the same transaction. The
priority of the third party lender of the purchase
money is an extension of this. He is said to be
in the position of an assignee of prior equitable
rights of the vendor, a theory similar to onr
advanced when the question was as to the applica1
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bility of the St.atute of Frauds t.o a promise to
give a mortgage on Jands to be acquired with
money loaned for that purpose by the promisee.
The other answer justifies the doctrine on
the equity and justice of protecting one who has
parted with his property on the faith of having
a security interest in it until the money for which
he was exchanging it is received, as against persons who, for different reasons, have inferior
claims." Pages 224-225.
" ... As against other mortgagee claimants to the
property, especially those who have made their
loan for the purpose of paying part of the purchase
the question is closer. These, unlike
the Qthers, have relied upon getting pa.id out of
the same specific property and have parted with
value on that reliane.e. Even so, the vendor has
the edge because the property he is relying on
for payment was previously his up to the time
of sale and mortgage back. There was never an
instant when he relinquished a hold on it. And
he would never have parted with it at all except
upon the belief and faith that if his buyer defaulted he could either recapture his property or
get paid out of it. And this is normally so even
though he may know that his buyer is going to
finance. the deal in part by borrowing some of
the purchase money from another and by giving
him a mortgage on the property. Other mortgages, on the other hand, even including lenders
of purchase money, parted only with money in
which they retained no interest whatsoever, and
placed their reliance for repayment of their debts
on getting a security interest in other property
not only never previously owned by them but not
even owned by the mortgagor at the time the
9

money was loaned, even though they might not
have known that fact. This difference in attitude
toward the hazard of losing property previously
owned and that of not getting an interest in property which had never before belonged to the
claimant is an old and important one." Pages 225226.
The lower court in its Memorandum Decision, hall
cited a Utah case, State vs. Johnson, 268 Pac. 561, for
the premise that the mortgage for purchase money must
be executed simultaneously with the deed of conveyance
from the Yendor. A reading of this case was dicta and
that the case turned on uncontroverted facts th:at the
purchase money mortgage was in fact intended to be a
second mortgage and the seller is the one who procured
the borrowed money and handled the complete transaction. It is also important to note that there was nf'ar!y
a month's time elapsed from the date of the deed and
the mortgage. In a much later Utah case) McMurdie u'
Shugg, 107 P2d 163, the court discussed the vendors lit'n
as being valid even though there were only promissory
notes executed at a much later time.
It is the writer's opinion that the reasoning set forth
in the American Law of Property justly sets forth the
reason for equity favoring the owner of the property.
It could also be stated that irrespective of the dates
shown on the document, it is certainly obvious that the
overall intent was one continuous transaction and that
both Kemps and Zions First National Bank were intentionally misled by the fraud on the part of Dr. Noble.
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B. Constructive notice of inquiry notice. It is elementary that a person is charged with having notice of
all matter reflected in a properly recorded document in a
recorder's office whether or not he has actual knowledge
or not. This is constructive notice. One form of constructive notice is, "inquiry notice."
". . . It exists when the circumstances are such
that a purchaser is in possession of facts which
would lead a reasonable man in his position to
make an investigation that would advise him of
the existence of prior unrecorded rights. He is
said to have constructive notice of their existence
whether he does or does not make the investigation. Th authorities are unanimous in holding
that he has notice of whatever the search would
disclose." No. 4 American Law of Property, paragraph 17 .11 pages 565 and 566. Also see Reilly vs.

McLean, 84 Utah 551, 563, 37 P.(2d) 799 (1934;
Corey vs. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P.(2d) 940
(1933), Le Vine vs. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109
Pac. 2.
If Kemps had of recorded their mortgage in the
recorder's office prior to the recording of Zions First
National Bank's mortgage, there can hardly be a question that Kemp's mortgage would be prior whether Zions
First National Bank had actual notice or had not actual
notice of the recording; this is constructive notice. By
the same token, if Zions First National Bank has constructive notice by virtue of the knowledge of the facts
that it had, as found by the jury, they have constructive
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notice of the seller's rights in the property. When a
bank has, or should have, knowledge that a person is
selling property, the bank can very easily protect itself
by merely asking the Kemps at the time they signed
the closing statement as to whether or not there is an
unpaid balance on the purchase price and as between
experienced real estate mortgage personnel as opposed
to inexperienced chicken ranchers, the owner of the
property should be favored.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is Appellants' contention that the
vendor purchase money mortgage has priority over a
lendors purchase money mortgage, and secondly, the
bank had constructive notice of the vendors mortgage
and was the bank's responsibiPy to make inquiry. Eitht:r
one of the two theories gives the Kemps priority, arid 1t.
combination of the two, should create httle problem :n
giving relief to the Kemps.
Respectfully submitted,
EVERETT E. DAHL
Attorney for Third Party
Plaintiffs Appellants
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